Communication Essay

Companies often organize their departments into teams that support each other to complete tasks or projects. When working in groups, communication is vital to the success of the team. Teams must work well individually as well as a members of a team. Communication on an individual level differs from communication within a group. Individually, you must actively listen and insure accurate understanding, offer to help solve problems, and focus on not being distracted by your own emotions. You cannot allow your emotions to distract you or cause you to miss the key points or misinterpret information. As an individual you must attend all group meetings, provide feedback and input to the discussions, and be respectful to others input and views. It is important that everyone in the group understand their role and responsibilities to the group. Everyone must contribute to discussions and meetings, and there should not be any silent members. To promote group discussion, you can start by going around the group and allowing each person to speak. This will allow each person a chance to be involved in the discussion and will spark topics of discussion. When working in a group, conflicts usually arise and should be dealt with immediately and directly. Ignoring conflict or disagreements will cause the team to be lose focus, become less productive. Most conflicts result from poor communication and misinterpretations. To resolve conflicts, it is important to locate where the break-down in communication happened. By talking through the conflict with the members of the group, and redefining tasks and objectives, the team can resolve these types of issues. To foster good communication within a group every member must listen to each other, work collaboratively to make decisions, adapt to changes and communication styles, assign specific tasks, set clear deadlines and expectations, and conduct follow-up meetings to review.

The 5 Worst Ways to Hunt for a Job

The 5 Worst Ways to Hunt for a Job Doing everything right and still not getting the gig? Make sure you’re not breaking any of these five hard-and-fast rules before despairing. The problem could be your strategy! 1. Getting stuck in search enginesFor every online application you submit, try to find an ‘in’ somewhere instead. Troll your LinkedIn for personal connections. Reach out. Use your network. That direct introduction could be the difference between an online application and an actual interview. Instead of doing keyword job searches, sign up to get Job Matches based on your entire profile.2. Applying to everythingYou’re amazing and you’re versatile, but you’re not qualified for everything. Make sure you’re not applying blind to absolutely every job, no matter whether you are qualified. Or, if you don’t look right on paper but can make a case for yourself, try and reach out directly to the hiring manager. If you’re not matching up to job requirements, co nsider taking a class or honing a new skill for the next round of applications.3. Expecting a breakSure, you’re a fast learner. But sometimes a company wants to hire someone who can jump right in the ring. Being a â€Å"fast learner† is great, but don’t expect that that will always get you through the door. Focus your energy instead on convincing your interviewer why you’d actually be perfect for the job, rather than claiming you can catch up as you go along.4. Being too aggressiveOkay, we get it. You’re looking for work. But networking is networking. Allow time to build a relationship before sticking your resume in a new connection’s face. Try and build a real relationship before you start asking for favors- or a job!5. Calling too muchIf you haven’t heard anything, play it cool. A simple, respectful follow-up email checking on their decision-making timeline will do fine. There’s a difference between proactivity and desperatio n. Make sure you’re on the good side.If you’re guilty of any of these five faux pas, consider trying a new strategy. These common sense guidelines should be a productive start.5 Job Search Tactics You Should Stop Immediately

Temperature Definition in Science

Temperature Definition in Science Temperature is an objective measurement of how hot or cold an object is. It can be measured with a thermometer or a calorimeter. It is a means of determining the internal energy contained within a given system. Because humans easily perceive the amount of heat and cold within an area, it is understandable that temperature is a feature of reality that we have a fairly intuitive grasp on. Consider that many of us have our first interaction with a thermometer in the context of medicine, when a doctor (or our parent) uses one to discern our temperature, as part of diagnosing an illness. Indeed, temperature is a critical concept in a wide variety of scientific disciplines, not just medicine. Heat Versus Temperature Temperature is different from heat, although the two concepts are linked. Temperature is a measure of the internal energy of a system, while heat is a measure of how energy is transferred from one system (or body) to another, or, how temperatures in one system are raised or lowered by interaction with another. This is roughly described by the kinetic theory, at least for gases and fluids. The kinetic theory explains that the greater the amount of heat is absorbed into a material, the more rapidly the atoms within that material begin to move, and, the faster atoms move, the more the temperature increases. As atoms begin to slow down their movement, the material becomes cooler. Things get a little more complicated for solids, of course, but thats the basic idea. Temperature Scales Several temperature scales exist. In the United States, the Fahrenheit temperature is most commonly used, though the International System of Units (SI unit) Centigrade (or Celsius) is used in most of the rest of the world. The Kelvin scale is used often in physics and is adjusted so that 0 degrees Kelvin is equal to absolute zero, which is, in theory, the coldest possible temperature and at which point all kinetic motion ceases. Measuring Temperature A traditional thermometer measures temperature by containing a fluid that expands at a known rate as it gets hotter and contracts as it gets cooler. As the temperature changes, the liquid within a contained tube moves along a scale on the device. As with much of modern science, we can look back to the ancients for the origins of the ideas about how to measure temperature back to the ancients. In the first century CE, the Greek philosopher and mathematician Hero (or Heron) of Alexandria (10–70 CE) wrote in his work Pneumatics about the relationship between temperature and the expansion of air. After the Gutenberg Press was invented, Heros book was published in Europe in 1575, its wider availability inspiring the creation of the earliest thermometers throughout the following century. Inventing the Thermometer The Italian astronomer Galileo  (1564–1642) was one of the first scientists recorded to have actually used a device that measured temperature, though it is unclear whether he actually built it himself or acquired the idea from someone else. He used a device called a thermoscope to measure the amount of heat and cold, at least as early as 1603. Throughout the 1600s, various scientists tried to create thermometers that measured temperature by a change of pressure within a contained measurement device. English physician Robert Fludd (1574–1637) built a thermoscope in 1638 that had a temperature scale built into the physical structure of the device, resulting in the first thermometer. Without any centralized system of measurement, each of these scientists developed their own measurement scales, and none of them really caught on until Dutch-German-Polish physicist and inventor  Daniel Gabriel Fahrenheit (1686–1736) built his in the early 1700s. He built a thermometer with alcohol in 1709, but it was really his mercury-based thermometer of 1714 that became the gold standard of temperature measurement. Edited by Anne Marie Helmenstine, Ph.D.

(history 24) summerize Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

(history 24) summerize - Essay Example Such incidences have been responsible the creation of security agencies like Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) which were mandated to infringe into the liberty of the citizens at the discretion of the president. The strongest part of the highlighted chapters under study in this book gives evidence of much power for the executive to warrant uncensored arrests and prosecution of people. The Vietnam War attracted discontent among many citizens as far as the taxpayer’s money wastage is concerned. In a bid to stay on course, the government resorted to police to consistently suppress the dissidents. It can be noted that United States under the leadership of president bush continued to hide behind terrorism to violate the rights of innocent citizens of Muslim faith (Kolin 43-66). It is equally evident that despite its global campaign for democracy, United States even under the administration of Obama has significantly violated foreign po licies by attack in other countries for vested interested like was the case of Iraq and the alleged measures against terrorist entities. The highlighted reading from pages 124-147 expresses the increasing conduct of United States to become a police state. The threat of terrorism attack and other socio-economic vulnerability perceived to be eminent from external aggression by the United States is responsible for its increased surveillance of internal territories and foreign lands. Their evident disregard of the judicial system as far human rights is concerned (McCoy 135-151). Taking the case of terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, several Muslims were deported and arrests carried out in full glare of various civil rights institutions under the supervision of the government (Kolin 126-9). The foreign policy of United States is a tool that is left for the executive to manipulate to their

Argument for God using the Design argument Essay

Argument for God using the Design argument - Essay Example The world was created in a way that human beings have no control or clue of the occurrence or existence of different phenomena. This essay is going to explore and affirm that God exists through the argument for design. Thesis Statement: The coordination and the intricate way in which human beings live by purpose suggest the existence of an intelligent designer. Overview Our lives in the world are inspired by the events and activities that we, human beings, undertake. However, in the process we have questions on our existence and, most importantly, on whether God exists. An argument by design explains the existence of God through the use of facts, theories and examples of how God created life. The world is meant for human inhabitation because there is a pattern in which life occurs and exists. It is true to argue that the world and life were designed by someone or a spirit that is unexplainable due to the following facts: Teleological orders: This is used to explain how order in the w orld occurs since everything in the world seems to follow a certain pattern. Teleological order can exist as spatial and temporal order whereby spatial order explains the co-presence while the latter explains succession. It is easy to look at the world and wonder at the facts of co-presence and succession. For instance, the human body is made up of millions of parts which interact with one another to come up with a complex living creature. William Paley who was an advocate of natural teleology argued that as a watch is a timepiece that is made up of millions of parts, then also the world and human life is designed that way. Another advocate of the teleological argument was Thomas Aquinas who argued that we see the world as being made up of many things some of which lack knowledge. He elucidates that these beings act for an end and this is evident by the small animals of living things (Sweet 95). As a result, a thing that does not have knowledge cannot move towards and end but only i f it is directed by an intelligent being. Apart from humans who possess knowledge, natural things cannot move towards an end and therefore, what drives their move towards end is an intelligent being who in this sense is God. Paley’s argument is that the world is created in a perfect manner different from a watch due to several reasons. For instance, in his natural teleological argument he says that â€Å"as a watch is perfectly crafted and a well oiled machine,† then the world is also perfect. For instance, in the world there is enough oxygen for everybody. It is not less because it would not support life and again, it is not a lot because it could lead to easy combustion. Apart from William Paley’s theory, other scientists have supported the analogy of design through the positioning of the earth. For instance, if we look at the way earth is positioned, it not so close to the sun because it would cause problems to people and life would not be supported. Furtherm ore, if the sun was in a far position from the earth, then life would not be supported in the world (Sweet 102). The look of the universe from this view presents us with conclusion that God was involved in the creation of the world. This is summed by Isaac Newton who said that the most beautiful system of the sun, planets and comets can only proceed through the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being. Criticisms: The William Paley analogy created a lot of criticism from a lot of quarters, especially from David Hume. The first

The Patriarchal and Hierarchical Development of Western Civilization Research Paper

The Patriarchal and Hierarchical Development of Western Civilization - Research Paper Example The earliest human civilizations emerged in the great river deltas of the world, where the land was fertile, water was plentiful, and the rivers provided a means of easy transport. It was the ability to create food surpluses, store them and transport them around the local area that prompted early societies to give up a nomadic hunter gatherer lifestyle, and develop solid buildings for permanent residence. This created the leisure time for experimentation and the practical need for the development of technologies. In Mesopotamia the first writing tablets appear to have been made, and they record many lists and commercial details relating to the trade in basic goods. The famous Epic of Gilgamesh tells the story of a famous ruler who started out behaving badly towards his subjects, and particularly women. He has a lot of power, partly because of his status as heir to the throne of Uruk, but partly also because â€Å"Two thirds of him is god, one-third of him is human† (Tablet 1). He is descended from a goddess, and the story tells of his interactions with both human and godly characters. Goddesses play a big part in the plot, since it is the goddess Aruru who creates the special friend Enkidu for Gilgamesh, and the goddess Ishtar openly taunts him and tries to tempt him into a relationship with her. Gilgamesh is at the mercy of these divine figures, and they largely determine the course of his life. Gilgamesh refuses the advances of Ishtar, showing great strength of character, but in the course of the epic he comes to learn the lessons that his mother and the other goddesses have made every effort to teach him: love for others is of much greater worth than riches, fame and power. The power of the female to bring forth life, and the danger of amorous entanglements, remain key motifs in the story, and they serve to tame the faults of the male, and to counterbalance his arrogance and immaturity. The ruler Gilgamesh at the end of the epic reflects on the massiv e architecture of his city’s walls which encloses the well-ordered community that thrives under the care of the goddess Ishtar: â€Å"is not even (the core of) the brick structure of kiln-fired brick, †¦ one league city, one league palm gardens, one league lowlands, the open area of the Ishtar temple, three leagues, and the open area of Uruk it encloses† (tablet XI). The moral of the tale is that he finally accepts that he must settle down as an administrator in a settled urban community, rather than a wanderer in search of amorous or other adventure. In contrast to this the female characters in The Iliad, which dates from more than a thousand years later, are little more than goods to be passed from one powerful male hero to another, sometimes more or less willingly in matrimony, and sometimes as the spoils of war. In The Iliad notions of power are very much the main theme (Sherman, 2003, p. 47) The women like Helen of Troy are trophies, and their function is mor e symbolic than as an active participant in society. Homer stresses the heroic deeds of the warriors, and his western society values possessions, cities, and conquering other peoples. The patriarchal line of descent is stressed through the frequent repetition of lists of names and titles such as this: â€Å"After Diomede same the Atreidae/Agamemnon and Menelaus and then/the two named Aias, jacketed with brawn/then came Idomeneus and his

Virtue - Plato Essay Example for Free

Virtue Plato Essay And others who are mute auditors. The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole dialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to Timaeus Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced in the Timaeus. I WENT down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, that I might offer up my prayers to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what man- ner they would celebrate the festival, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; but that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had finished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, chanced to catch sight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said, Polemarchus desires you to wait. I turned round, and asked him where his master was. There he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait. Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucons brother, Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession. Polemarchus said to me, I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city. You are not far wrong, I said. But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are? Of course. And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where you are. May there not be the alternative, I said, that we may per- suade you to let us go? But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said. Certainly not, replied Glaucon. Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured. Adeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in honor of the goddess which will take place in the evening? With horses! I replied. That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race? Yes, said Polemarchus; and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see this festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse. Glaucon said, I suppose, since you insist, that we must. Very good, I replied. Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus. There too was Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a garland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were some other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down by him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said: You dont come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were still able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the Piraeus. For, let me tell you that the more the pleasures of the body fade away, the greater to me are the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not, then, deny my request, but make our house your re- sort and keep company with these young men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us. I replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to inquire whether the way is smooth and easy or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you, who have arrived at that time which the poets call the threshold of old age: Is life harder toward the end, or what report do you give of it? I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is: I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away; there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too, being old, and every other old man would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experi- ence, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles — are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time when he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the pas- sions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but mens characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden. I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on — Yes, Cephalus, I said; but I rather suspect that people in general are not convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter. You are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: If you had been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been famous. And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age can- not be a light burden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself. May I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or acquired by you? Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony, that which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my father, Lysanias, reduced the property below what it is at present; and I shall be satisfied if I leave to these my sons not less, but a little more, than I received. That was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth. That is true, he said. Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question? — What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth? One, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer to that other place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and alarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age: Hope, he says, cherishes the soul of him who lives in justice and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey — hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man. How admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and there-fore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest. Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it? — to speak the truth and to pay your debtsno more than this? And even to this are there not exceptions? Sup- pose that a friend when in his right mind has deposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I should be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition. You are quite right, he replied. But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice. Quite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus, interposing. I fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the sacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polem- archus and the company. Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said. To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices. Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you, truly say, about justice? He said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me to be right. I shall be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the re- verse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt. True. Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to make the return? Certainly not. When Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was jus- tice, he did not mean to include that case? Certainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend, and never evil. You mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a debt — that is what you would imagine him to say? Yes. And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them? To be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them; and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to himthat is to say, evil. Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of the nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt. That must have been his meaning, he said. By heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us? He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies. And what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what? Seasoning to food. And what is that which justice gives, and to whom? If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies. That is his meaning, then? I think so. And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness? The physician. Or when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea? The pilot. And in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most able to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend? In going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other. But when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician? No. And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot? No. Then in time of peace justice will be of no use? I am very far from thinking so. You think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war? Yes. Like husbandry for the acquisition of corn? Yes. Or like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes — that is what you mean? Yes. And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace? In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use. And by contracts you mean partnerships? Exactly. But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a game of draughts? The skilful player. And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder? Quite the reverse. Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp- player is certainly a better partner than the just man? In a money partnership. Yes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not? Certainly. And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better? True. Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred? When you want a deposit to be kept safely. You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie? Precisely. That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless? That is the inference. And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the State; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser? Clearly. And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician? Certainly. And so of all other things —justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful? That is the inference. Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is not he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting best able to ward off a blow? Certainly. And he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best able to create one? True. And he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the enemy? Certainly. Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief? That, I suppose, is to be inferred. Then if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it. implied in the argument. That is Then after all, the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grand- father of Odysseus, who is a favorite of his, affirms that He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury. And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft; to be practised, however, for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies — that was what you were saying? No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words. Well, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who are so really, or only in seeming? Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil. Yes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good seem to be so, and conversely? That is true. Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends? True. And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good? Clearly. But the good are just and would not do an injustice? True. Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong? Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral. Then I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust? that better. I like But see the consequence: Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has friends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very op- posite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides. Very true, he said; and I think that we had better correct an error into which we seem to have fallen in the use of the words friend and enemy. What was the error, Polemarchus? I asked. We assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good. And how is the error to be corrected? We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said. You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies? Yes. And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good, and harm to our enemies when they are evil? Yes, that appears to me to be the truth. But ought the just to injure anyone at all? Undoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies. When horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated? The latter. Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs? Yes, of horses. And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses? Of course. And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man? Certainly. And that human virtue is justice? To be sure. Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust? That is the result. But can the musician by his art make men unmusical? Certainly not. Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen? Impossible. And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad? Assuredly not. Any more than heat can produce cold? It cannot. Or drought moisture? Clearly not. Nor can the good harm anyone? Impossible. And the just is the good? Certainly. Then to injure a friend or anyone else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust? I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates. Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies — to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just. I agree with you, said Polemarchus. Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against anyone who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer? I am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said. Shall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be? Whose? I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the first to say that justice is doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies. Most true, he said. Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered? Several times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We were quite panic-stricken at the sight of him. He roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honor to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy. I was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling. Indeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been struck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was therefore able to reply to him. Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, dont be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not in- tentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were knocking under to one another, and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us. How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh; thats your ironical style! Did I not foresee — have I not already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering? You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me — then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were to retort: Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely to say some other number which is not the right one? — is that your meaning? — How would you answer him? Just as if the two cases were at all alike! he said. Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not? I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers? I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them. But what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you? Done to me! — as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the wise — that is what I deserve to have done to me. What, and no payment! A pleasant notion! I will pay when I have the money, I replied. But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasyma- chus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates. Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does — refuse to answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of someone else. Why, my good friend, I said, how can anyone answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be someone like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself? Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as anyone might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says, Thank you. That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise anyone who appears to me to speak well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well. Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you wont. Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polyd- amas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds the eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is therefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us? Thats abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument. Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer. Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of govern- ment differ — there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies? Yes, I know. And the government is the ruling power in each State? Certainly. And the different forms of government make laws demo- cratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all States there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger. Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to discover. But let me remark that in defining justice you have yourself used the word interest, which you forbade me to use. It is true, however, that in your definition the words of the stronger are added. A small addition, you must allow, he said. Great or small, never mind about that: we must first inquire whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but you go on to say of the stronger; about this addition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further. Proceed. I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for sub- jects to obey their rulers? I do. But are the rulers of States absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err? To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err? Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes not? True. When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their in- terest; you admit that? Yes. And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their sub- jectsand that is what you call justice? Doubtless. Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger, but the reverse? What is that you are saying? he asked. I am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted? Yes. Then you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the stronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger? Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus. Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness. But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may some- time command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice. Yes, Polemarchus — Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers is just. Yes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the stronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger. But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest — this was what the weaker had to do; and this was affirmed by him to be justice. Those were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus. Never mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his statement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not? Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken? Yes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible, but might be sometimes mistaken. You argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time when he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the physician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be skilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of accuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is unerr- ing, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his com- mands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger. Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer? Certainly, he replied. And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any de- sign of injuring you in the argument? Nay, he replied, suppose is not the word — I know it; but you will be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.